

SUBJECT: (Optional)
CIA/FBI Briefing of the House Select Committee
on Assassinations (HSCA)

FROM: [Redacted Box] EXTENSION NO. DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) DATE RECEIVED FORWARDED OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)

1.	C/SE	18 MAY 1978	
2.			
3.	SA/DO/O	15/18	
4.	MR BRECKINRIDGE		
5.	ADDO		
6.			
7.	DDO		
8.			
9.	OLC (Attn: [Redacted Box])		
10.			
11.	C/SE [Redacted Box]		
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

1. [Redacted Box]
2. [Redacted Box]
3. file HSCA

SECRET [Redacted Box]

[Redacted Box]

SECRET [REDACTED]

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CLC #78-2076

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17 May 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Soviet/East European Division

FROM : [REDACTED]
Chief, SE/ [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : CIA/FBI Briefing of the House Select
Committee on Assassinations (HSCA)

1. On 16 May 1978 [REDACTED] Chief, SE/ [REDACTED] of CIA, and Messrs. Jim Adams and Jim Nolan of FBI Headquarters briefed HSCA Chairman Representative Louis Stokes, Representative Samuel Divine, the ranking Republican of HSCA, and Robert Blakey, Chief of the Staff of HSCA. Also present was Mr. Drew Clark of FBI Headquarters. This briefing was the third and last of three planned briefings aimed at limiting the proliferation of information which might be damaging to the security of ongoing FBI and CIA operations. (The first two briefings were of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Oversight Committee on Intelligence and have been reported on previously.) It had been agreed by the FBI and CIA, particularly in view of the interest aroused by Epstein's book "The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald" and questions [REDACTED] that these briefings were in order. By briefing selected members of the committee and staff, it was hoped that further inquiries [REDACTED] would be diminished.

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2. In the course of our 75 minute briefing session the following points were made by CIA and FBI briefers:

a. Both agencies are firmly committed to the view that [REDACTED]

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ship had existed. Blakey hypothesized further that this was done because the Soviets were deeply concerned with the possibility of nuclear war resulting from the Kennedy assassination.

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Stokes, however, supported Blakey's position. The compromise that evolved was that Blakey will review the material and, if he then still feels that others on his staff should be made privy to this information, the matter will be negotiated further. (My view is that the Bureau will probably end up having to accede to Blakey's demands.)

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Don Gregg and me alone [REDACTED] Plans were made to get together at CIA Headquarters at 0900 on 19 May.

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5. General Comments: I believe that our briefings of the three Congressional committees were useful. If we had not given them, I believe knowledge [REDACTED] perhaps other sources would have proliferated uncontrollably. I am not suggesting that the course of action we pursued will succeed or that proliferation will not take place or that eventually there will not be a leak providing U.S.

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[REDACTED] but I do think that our try was worthwhile. Time will tell. [REDACTED]

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Distribution:

Original - [REDACTED]

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